Herman develop this argument by examining the effects of fragmentation in the parliament, government, and opposition on government stability. 5 They find that ideology does not play a role in duration, while the share of the antisystem parties negatively affects government stability. The weighted number of parties and one-party status are also found to affect duration significantly.
In two other studies examining the effects of the parliamentary and governmental characteristics, other factors are found to influence cabinet durations. Sanders and Herman find that antisystem parties can influence duration, as well the degree of legislative support and the number of parties in the government. 6 Dodd also concludes that cabinet coalitional status affects the length of time a government stays in office. 7 Another influential study concludes that cabinet majority status, minimal winning coalition status, ideological cleavage within the cabinet, and number of government parties can significantly affect the tenure of governments. 8 In the 1980s scholars began to debate the meaning of cabinet stability and termination. 9 Browne, Frendreis, and Gleiber developed the events approach to the problem of cabinet stability. 10 They state that the problem with the previous studies was the assumption that "the values associated with actor preferences and situational attributes are constant over the life of a cabinet."
11 Instead, they argue that "account must be taken of the events that threaten the stability of cabinets and the processes that produce them if we are to achieve a more successful theoretical understanding of the problem of cabinet stability."
12 They describe events as anything that produces uncertainty for the coalitions, ranging from scandals to the death of the prime minister to contentious political issues. The events analysis shows that there is a low and invariant probability for a critical event to occur. Events are therefore conditionally independent, meaning that "the chance of a cabinet surviving from the first day of its tenure to the second is equal to the probability of its surviving from day 1000 to 1001." 13 King, Alt, Burns, and Laver produce the most encompassing theory of cabinet duration by including both the events approach and deterministic factors. 14 In this article, most of these variables are tested with the use of their unified approach.
Postcommunist Governments
Previous studies have given various explanations for the terminations of postcommunist governments. In their case-specific analysis of government duration in various postcommunist states, Henderson and Robinson point out that the Bulgarian government collapsed in 1991 because of the inability of the government to keep its promises on privatization and decommunization. 15 In their study of the 1991 Polish government, Henderson and Robinson find that, while institutions played a critical role, the actual policy outcomes also were important in producing cabinet instability. 16 They identify coalition partners, bad relations with the president, and economic problems as factors shortening the tenure of governments. For example, the 1993 Polish government was short-lived because it could not reconcile the vast ideological differences between the president and government. In another study, Blondel and Müller-Rommel analyze the setting, structure, and life of cabinets in sixteen postcommunist countries but fail to provide a systematic and quantitative analysis of the termination of governments. 17 Some of the same hypotheses used in advanced democracies can be tested on postcommunist governments. Scholars have discovered that many behavioral and institutional attributes present in western Europe are either absent or not fully developed in postcommunist Europe. These various findings point to the dissimilarity of postcommunist Europe to advanced democracies; it simply can not be expected to behave in the same manner, especially in the case of government duration. For example, scholars suggest that postcommunist states have a number of problems, including a lack of mass partisanship, substantial electoral volatility, weak party system institutionalization, and fractionalized parties without crystallized ideological programs or internal party discipline. 18 After collectively evaluating the conclusions of these studies, one would be hardpressed to suggest that the same institutional and economic determinants of government duration in the advanced democracies could also be found in the transitional democracies of postcommunist Europe. This assertion is in fact reasonable. The ways in which cabinets are terminated depend on the behavior of key actors, all of which have similar principal interests to those of western Europe. Thus, the behavior of veto actors in postcommunist Europe is likely to have the same sort of effect as in western Europe, because they are all acting within their own self-interest. Further, veto actors will be able to react to poor economic outcomes in ways that will reduce the survivability of governments. If this hypothesis is true, then it has profound implications for the study of institutions and government stability in postcommunist Europe. It is a testament to the strength of these institutions and the processes of institutionalization and consolidation, because transitions in vastly different circumstances have installed institutions that constrain or encourage behavior in predictable and consistent manners.
After all, some postcommunist states have adopted parliamentary governments and have also governed by coalition governments similar to western European systems. Blondel and Müller-Rommel dedicate most of their first chapter to the defense of comparing western and eastern European cabinets. 19 They state that the eastern European countries have benefited from the experiences of western Europe, which is evident in the region's institutional choices. In fact, when the average government duration scores of the two regions are examined, there do not appear to be any substantively meaningful differences between the two regions. Table 1 provides the mean duration for governments in eastern Europe and western Europe. The mean cabinet duration in eastern Europe for the period 1991-2003 is 582.5 days. In western Europe, the mean duration of eleven continuously democratic states from 1945 to 1989 is 636.7 days, with Italy having the lowest mean duration (251 days) and Ireland the highest mean duration (935 days). Although it appears that the two regions are quite similar in mean durations, it is necessary to take a closer look in order to find the effects of specific institutional and economic arrangements on the tenures of postcommunist governments. The expectation is that the conclusions will be similar to studies focusing on advanced democracies.
Dangerous Conditions
Studies of cabinet duration provide a number of governmental characteristics that lead to short government tenures. Taylor and Herman argue that the number of parliamentary parties shortens cabinet duration by blocking the passage of successful policies. 20 They also test the effect of party fractionalization in the parliament, measured with Rae's index of fractionalization. The effective number of parties should affect government duration because, as the parliament becomes more fractionalized, it becomes more difficult and complex to form coalitions. 21 Warwick states that the effective number of parties is "an indicator of the complexity of the bargaining system in the parliament" and finds that it has a significant effect on the survivability of western European cabinets. 22 This finding leads to the first hypothesis.
Hypothes i s 1:
As the effective number of parties in parliament increas es, the hazard rates of governments will increase. Lowell notes that the most effective government is composed of only one party because, "the larger the number of discordant groups that form the majority, the harder the task of pleasing them all, and the more feeble and unstable the position of the cabinet." 23 Further, as the number of parties in the cabinet increases, the task of reaching agreement among government parties grows more difficult and improves the chances of a government breakdown. 24 Likewise, Tsebelis argues that, as the number of potential veto players increases (as in coalition governments), the ability to generate policy quickly decreases. 25 In a system with a wealth of veto players, policy deadlock becomes more likely because of the presence of actors with divergent interests, reducing the probable survival rates of governments.
Hypothesis 2:
As the effective number of parties in cabinet increases, the haz ard rates of governments will increase.
The type of government is also hypothesized to have substantial impacts on government survivability. The type of government takes into account both the number of parties needed to form a coalition and the coalition's majority or minority status. 26 While it has been argued that the majority status produces more stable governments than minority cabinets, Strom shows that minority governments are "rational solutions under specified conditions." 27 Warwick, on the other hand, argues that majority governments survive longer than minority governments regardless of the other conditions. 28 They survive longer because minority governments are often crisis governments that have to govern in the face of a parliament with an opposition majority. 29 Dodd differentiates coalition governments into three types: minimum winning coalitions, surplus governments in which there are more than enough parties to form a majority, and minority/undersized governments which do not have the majority of the seats of the parliament. 30 He states that the minimum winning coalitions are superior to surplus and minority governments. Surplus governments contain unnecessary parties that increase the deprivation the parties suffer, so parties are expected to move rapidly to reduce the coalition to the minimum size, thus threatening stability. Minority coalitions survive only until a minimum winning coalition can be established. As Dodd states, "this cabinet is faced constantly with the possibility that while it attempts to govern, other parties are negotiating their differences so that they can overthrow the cabinet and attain ministerial status, or at least force the dissolution of parliament and new elections." 31 Minority governments in postcommunist Europe are threatened in the same manner by the opposition as governments in advanced democracies. For example, in Slovakia in 1993 the cabinet lost majority status and afterwards faced a majority opposition in the legislature that forced a successful vote of no confidence in 1994.
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Hypothesis 3a: Governments with majority support in the assembly will have a lower hazard rate than minority governments.
Hypotheses 3b: Minimum winning coalition governments will have a lower hazard rate than surplus governments, and surplus governments will have a lower hazard rate than minority governments.
The type of political system may also affect cabinet duration, because of the possibility of conflict between the head of state (president) and the head of government (prime minister). One of the reasons for the cabinet to be considered as terminated is listed as the intervention of the head of state. As the powers of the president widen, it is expected for him or her to intervene more if he or she does not approve of the government's actions. Although none of the countries in the postcommunist states can be considered as presidential, five among the ten are semipresidential regimes (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia), in that they provide some nonlegislative powers to the head of state. 33 Blondel and Müller-Rommel also state that the relative role of the president and prime minister in these states generates instability. 34 A strong example is Poland, where the government was resolved in 1993 because of the intervention by the head of state who could not reconcile his differences with the government. 35 Whatever the underlying reason, semipresidential systems may cause poor relations between the president and the prime minister that may lead to political instability.
Hypothesis 4: Semipresidential regimes will have higher hazard rates, relative to parliamentary systems.
Economic indicators are vastly important for the longevity of governments. As Hibbs states, "macroeconomic policy toward unemployment and inflation generates intense controversy and conflict among key political actors and interest groups." 36 Robertson argues that economic conditions matter because of the public's response as well as the consideration of potential coalition partners. 37 He argues that, as important as the pressure on the governments is during poor economic conditions, the governments by themselves reassess the advantages of being part of the government in times of economic downturn. It may drive parties out of the coalition because government policies are hurting their constituents. 38 It can be argued that inflation and unemployment rates erode the public's confidence in the government and affect the public's perception of the leader's competence. 39 Further, elections provide the electorate with the ability to reward or punish incumbent governments based on their perceptions of aggregate economic conditions. 40 It is easy to find several examples from postcommunist Europe dealing with the importance of economic conditions. In Lithuania the single party majority government of Slezevicius was forced to resign as a result of economic troubles. 41 In Czechoslovakia the fiscal crisis in 1997 led to protests and the resignation of the government. In 1998 the Romanian prime minister Ciorbea resigned because the economic problems prevented the economic development that he had proposed. The next two hypotheses test whether these anecdotes are consistent on a broad scale with the rest of the region.
Hypothesis 5a: As the unemployment rate increases, the hazard rates of governments will increase.
Hypothesis 5b: As the inflation rate increases, the hazard rates of governments will increase.
Research Design
Several data sets were used in order to analyze these hypotheses. Müller-Rommel, Fettelschoss, and Harfst provide data on the government duration (measured in months) and the number of government parties of postcommunist democracies. 42 Rose and Munro provide information on the number of parties in parliament. 43 The effective numbers of parties in parliament and government are calculated with data on the seat shares of the parties in the parliament. 44 To test the third hypothesis, six types of government are used, where single party majority, minimal winning coalition, and surplus coalitions are recoded together as a dichotomous variable to test majority status and the minority governments are recoded together for the minority variable. 45 Finally, annual unemployment data are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, while the monthly Consumer Price Index (and some monthly unemployment data for a few states) is available from the International Labour Office's (ILO) Yearbook of Labour Statistics. 46 Quarterly or monthly data are not available for unemployment for a long series for the sample of postcommunist states. 47 To complete the monthly duration analysis, interpolated monthly scores are used.
48 Table 2 provides the summary statistics of these variables.
The dependent variable in this analysis is the time (in months) each cabinet spends at risk before experiencing either removal from office or the end of the sample (December 2003). Duration modeling, then, provides a much better statistical test of the hypotheses than ordinary least squares (OLS).
49 Parametric duration models start with the assumption that there is some distribution that accurately portrays the underlying hazard rate of an event occurring at any given interval of time (in this case, government failure). Choosing a model specification can be difficult, especially because the Cox semiparametric model does not demand that the underlying hazard rate be specified.
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There is some theoretical reason for an a priori specification of the shape of the underlying baseline hazard rate for different governments. For example, the hazard rate is not believed to be flat, so the exponential model is rejected because of its assumption of a flat baseline hazard. The underlying hazard monotonically increases the longer a government is in office, which would suggest that a Weibull model is appropriate. Therefore, there is both a theoretical and a methodological justification for using the Weibull model to determine the effects of institutional and economic factors on government failure.
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Institutional Constraints, Policy Successes, and Government Duration
In order to test the hypotheses, a model with all of the hypothesized variables is first estimated. The expectation is that the variables empowering the institutional opposition (coalition governments, effective number of parliamentary parties) and poor economic performance (unemployment and inflation rates) will decrease the survival rates of governments.
The first model provides tests of the first three hypotheses. Table 3 presents the first model with all of the explanatory variables; a hazard ratio greater than 1 represents a covariate increasing the hazard rate of government failure while a hazard ratio less than 1 indicates a factor positively affecting survival. The first two hypotheses deal with the number of political parties in various institutions. The first hypothesis is not supported (hr 0.96 p-value 0.78), as the hazard rate is not statistically significant. After controlling for the institutional arrangement and economic performance, it does not seem to matter how fractionalized the parliament is.
The second hypothesis argues that, as the number of parties that are required to keep the coalition intact increases, it becomes more difficult to satisfy their competing interests. This hypothesis appears to be supported, as the hazard ratio for the number of government parties variable is 2.06 (p-value <0.05). This indicates that, for every one unit increase in the number of parties in government, the probability of government failure (given that the government has lasted until then) increases by 106 percent. The Weibull analysis showed that the number of government parties increases the risk of failure by providing greater division over policy matters and more difficulty in ensuring the cohesiveness of the coalition. Figure 1 provides 
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parties in the coalition. As expected, governments that rely on multiple parties to ensure a majority coalition are much more unstable than single party governments. Although the hazard rate is quite small and similar for all the governments in the first two years of office, about two years into the tenure the probability of government failure becomes much higher for four and five party governments. The Weibull model points to the importance of the effective number of government parties, as the risk of government termination increases substantially as the number of parties in government increases. The institutional variable with the largest impact on postcommunist government duration is anticipated to be the type of government. Hypothesis 3a compares the hazard rates of majority governments to minority governments. Not having a majority of parliamentary support should substantially reduce the chance of termination, relative to minority governments. This hypothesis is tested by creating a dichotomous variable for both majority governments (single party governments, minimum winning coalitions, and surplus coali- tions) and for caretaker governments and by estimating the model with minority governments (single and multiple party minority governments) as the reference category. Majority governments experience 19 percent of the risk of government termination that minority governments face after controlling for the other covariates. Figure 2 shows that majority governments have much lower hazard rates than minority governments. While the risk of failure for a majority government increases slowly over time, as soon as a minority government comes into office the chance of removal is much higher than for majority governments. Moreover, the hazard rate increases steadily over time for minority governments. As expected, caretaker governments have much higher hazard rates than minority governments (hr 22.56 p-value <0.001). It is therefore difficult for postcommunist governments to have a lengthy tenure in office if they are faced with majority opposition in the assembly.
The second model provides a test of Hypothesis 3b, that minimum winning coalitions would have a lower hazard rate than surplus governments, which would have smaller hazards than minority governments. To test this hypothesis, the dichotomous variables representing type of government had to be reconfigured. For this model, dichotomous variables for single party governments, surplus coalitions, minority governments, and caretaker governments are included. 52 The reference category is minimum winning coali- tions. It is therefore expected that the hazard rate for surplus governments will have a hazard rate larger than 1 (greater than minimum winning coalitions) and the hazard rate for minority governments should be greater than the hazard rate for surplus governments (relative to minimum winning coalitions). This hypothesis is not supported, as there is no statistical difference between the hazard rates of single party governments relative to minimum winning coalitions. Surplus governments have a much smaller risk of removal from office than minimum winning coalitions (hr 0.35, p-value <0.05). Minority and caretaker governments, on the other hand, have much higher hazard rates than minimum winning coalitions (4.04 and 107.30, respectively). In addition, this model provides a slightly better overall fit than Model 1, as shown by its larger log-likelihood (-197.1).
In the final institutional hypothesis semipresidential systems are expected to have shorter tenures than parliamentary systems, because of the nonlegislative powers of the president. 53 The data do not support this hypothesis; the semipresidential variable fails to approach conventional levels of statistical significance in either model. This finding is particularly interesting given the high levels of tension between presidents and prime ministers in many of the semipresidential systems in the sample. Based upon these findings, it appears as though the tenure of postcommunist governments is partly determined prior to their taking office, though not because of semipresidentialism. Having a majority opposition with a high number of government parties substantially limits the tenure of transitional governments. 
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Weibull regression
The f inal two hypotheses evaluate the effects of economic performance in off ice. Are governments bound by institutions, or can successful economic policy outcomes allow governments to lengthen their tenures beyond what one would anticipate given the institutional environment? There is some support for these findings because, while a rising unemployment rate has no effect on the hazard rate for postcommunist governments (hr 1.06, p-value 0.162), the logged inflation rate increases the probability of removal (hr 1.59, p-value <0.001). 54 Figure 3 provides the hazard rates for three hypothetical governments, with inflation at its twenty-fifth, mean, and seventy-fifth percentiles. Governments facing rising prices have much higher risks of removal than governments facing price stability. These findings provide some optimism concerning the ability of governments to extend their tenure based on successful policy outcomes. To illustrate the robustness of the results, Table 4 provides the same models estimated with a Cox semiparametric model.
These findings show the importance of institutional arrangements in the study of government duration. The results indicate that institutional arrangements largely determine the range of possible durations for a government. This conclusion is not entirely pessimistic, however. Within that in-stitutionally determined range of tenures, governments can extend their tenure to the limits based on successful economic policy performance. These results are somewhat counterintuitive in light of previous studies on the weaknesses of institutions and the underdevelopment of mass behavior in postcommunist Europe. These studies would seem to suggest that it is unreasonable for scholars to anticipate that institutions and economic performance will result in the same outcomes in the region as they do in advanced democracies. For example, scholars suggest that postcommunist states have a number of problems, including a lack of mass partisanship, substantial electoral volatility, and fractionalized parties, without crystallized ideological 
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Table 4 Cox Model Robustness Checks for Postcommunist Government Duration
Zeynep Somer-Topcu and Laron K. Williams programs or strong internal party discipline in party systems that are not institutionalized. 55 Even in the absence (or presence) of these institutional attributes, both institutions that give power to domestic opposition and economic performance affect governments in similar ways. This conclusion has profound implications for the study of institutions and government stability in postcommunist Europe. It is a testament to the strength of these institutions and the interdependent processes of institutionalization and consolidation, because transitions in vastly different circumstances still created institutions that constrain or encourage government behavior in predictable and consistent manners. Behavior common in most of western Europe is also present in a region full of political uncertainty and transition such as postcommunist Europe. 51. The first model is estimated with a number of different specifications of the underlying hazard rate, including the Gompertz, exponential, Weibull, log logistic, and generalized Gamma. The Weibull estimation has both the largest log likelihood and the smallest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Further, the parameters from the Gamma model make it possible to test various distributions. The parameter is significant at the .000 level, which implies that the null hypothesis that = 0 (which is the test of the lognormal distribution) can be rejected. Additional Wald tests show that the null hypothesis that =1 (Weibull distribution) can not be rejected, but the null hypothesis =1 can be rejected. A chi square test of the sigma parameter shows that the null hypothesis =1 (with a chi square of 110.92, with one degree of freedom and a p-value of .000) can be rejected. This rules out the exponential model since the null hypothesis =1 can not be rejected but the null hypothesis =1 can be rejected. The Wald test that the and parameters are equal is also rejected, implying that the Gamma distribution is not effective.
NOTES
52. The single party variable includes single party majority goverments; the surplus coalition variable only includes surplus coalitions; the minority variable includes both single party minorities and multiple party minorities; and the caretaker goverment includes only caretaker goverments.
53. Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
54. Logging the inflation rate removes the unit root and makes the series stationary. 55. On the lack of mass partisanship, see Colton; on electoral volatility, see Tavits; on weak party system institutionalization, see Mainwaring and Torcal; on fractionalized parties, see Moser; on parties without crystallized ideological programs, see Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Toka.
